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of GlossinessNew insights into the perception of surface glossiness embody a conceptual
change in perception research. Instead of estimating the physical properties of
objects, the brain exploits ‘invariants’ — even though these sometimes make
us get the answer wrong.Roland W. Fleming
Working out how the brain estimates
the material properties of surfaces is
one of the most exciting and rapidly
developing areas of visual
neuroscience. The perception of
glossiness is of particular interest,
partly because very small changes
in the image, such as the addition of
a small highlight, can have radical
effects on how the brain interprets
whole surfaces. One recurring theme
in research on this topic is that
factors other than the physical
glossiness of a surface can have large
and unpredictable effects on its
perceived glossiness [1–7]. Changing
the shape or lighting conditions can
often make a huge difference to how
glossy a surface appears; for
example, the apple in Figure 1A
appears less glossy than it does in
Figure 1B because the lighting is
more diffuse in A than in B. So far there
is little consensus on when and why
these different effects occur.
Sometimes changing the shape makes
surfaces appear more glossy,
sometimes less, in a seemingly erratic
way. Why does this occur? Is there
some unifying principle that can
explain the inconsistent effects of
shape and lighting on perceived
glossiness? A recent study by
Marlow and colleagues [8], reported
in this issue of Current Biology,
suggests the explanation lies in
the brain’s use of a number of
simple — but imperfect — heuristics.
The main argument of Marlow et al.
[8] is that the visual system doesn’t
actually estimate glossiness per se;
instead, they argue, the brain
measures a set of simple ‘proximal
stimulus properties’ that
approximately correlate with
glossiness in typical circumstances,
but which may get the answer wrongunder other conditions. In other words,
rather than estimating the physical
properties of surfaces, the brain
measures whatever it can from the
image itself, and identifies useful
statistical patterns or cues among the
measurements. The authors show that
such cues can predict the failures as
well as the successes of human gloss
perception.
Marlow et al. [8] rendered a set of
stimuli consisting of a glossy material
in the form of bumpy reliefs. They then
varied both the depth of the reliefs and
the patterns of illumination incident
on the surfaces to create a range
of different images. All the surfaces
had exactly the same surface
reflectance — they were all made out
of the same ‘stuff’ — so that a perfect
observer should report seeing them all
equally glossy. But this was not what
the authors found. As previous
authors have also reported, the
differences in lighting and shape have
large spurious effects on the apparent
reflectance of the surfaces.
Experimental participants reported
seeing a wide range of different
degrees of glossiness for the different
stimuli. However, the pattern of results
is complex, and in many cases
non-monotonic. Shallow reliefs appear
glossier than deeper reliefs when the
lighting is facing the surfaces, but less
glossy when the lighting comes from
above. Under some conditions the
intermediate reliefs appear glossier
than either the shallow or the deep
reliefs. Can any sense bemade of these
results?
Importantly, both the lighting
direction and the relief of the
surfaces have large effects on the
properties of the highlights visible in
the images. When a surface is
shallow and illuminated from in front, it
appears awash with large blurry
highlights. In contrast, when the reliefhas higher curvature, the highlights
appear smaller and focused, like
dots. If the visual system uses the
extent to which a surface produces
highlights as a proxy for the true
physical surface reflectance, then the
pattern of results starts to make more
sense. Surfaces that produce large,
visible highlights have the ‘look’ that
we associate with glossy surfaces. But
when the same surface produces
highlights that are puny in terms of
size, contrast or distinctness, then the
surface doesn’t look as glossy,
even though the physical reflectance
is the same. In other words, the
‘distal’ physical property of the
surface isn’t actually what the brain
cares about. Rather, it is the extent
to which the surface produces
highlights that determines
its appearance.
To capture this intuition,Marlow et al.
[8] identified several different
properties of highlights that represent
their clarity and salience in the
image — size, contrast, sharpness
and binocular separation from the
surface (see Figure 1C–E). Computing
these quantities directly from the
image is not trivial, so instead, the
authors showed all the images to
new participants and asked them to
judge each property independently.
The subjects were not asked
anything about the glossiness of the
surface. They just had to report how
large, or high contrast the highlights
appeared.
As expected, the participants’
responses also vary systematically
with lighting and surface relief.
Importantly, the authors found that
a weighted combination of the
ratings for the individual cues could
account for 94% of the variance in the
glossiness ratings from the other
participants. In other words, the
simple cues can account for almost
all of the seemingly inconsistent
effects of lighting and shape on the
perception of glossiness. When asked
to judge glossiness, subjects actually








Figure 1. Effects of illumination on the apparent glossiness of an apple, along with three of the
cues that Marlow et al. [8] suggest may explain changes in appearance.
In (A) an apple was photographed with the curtains drawn, whereas in (B) the curtains were
opened, creating a clearly visible highlight on the apple. Most people see the apple in (B) to
be somewhat glossier than in (A), even though the physical surfaces are identical. Marlow
et al. [8] find that changes in appearance can be well predicted by some simple properties
of the highlights, such as (C) the size, (D) the contrast and (E) the sharpness.
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definition of ‘glossiness’ for the human
brain.
As this was a correlational study,
Marlow et al. [8] cannot be certain
that it is exactly these specific cues that
determine glossiness perception.
There are potentially many other ways
of capturing the intuition of bigger,
more salient highlights. However, this
is not the important point of the
study. The important point is that
instead of representing glossiness in
physical terms, the brain uses a set
of imperfect cues or heuristics.
These heuristics predict the errors
as well as the successes of
gloss perception in the authors’
experiments.
The idea that the brain exploits
heuristics is almost as old as the
study of perception itself. However,
Marlow et al. [8] have captured
a change in current thinking about
the goals of perception, which
applies to much more than just gloss
ratings. Many problems in perception,
from visual stereopsis to auditorypitch perception can be posed as
a process of estimating physical
parameters — distances, frequencies,
and so on. But this may be the wrong
way of thinking about the biological
problems that the brain solves.
Rather than estimating physical
properties of the world, it may be
more important — and easier — to
compute systematic relations
between internal states. In other
words, it may be better to identify
quantities that can guide decisions
consistently in the face of changes of
irrelevant variables, whether or not
they map cleanly onto physical
properties. For example, ‘colour
constancy’ should not be posed, as it
usually is, as a problem of estimating
the spectral reflectance of surfaces
under varying illuminants; rather,
colour constancy is the process of
identifying image measurements that
are as close as possible to invariant
across transformations caused by
other scene factors, such as lighting,
shape or viewpoint. Only with this
alternative goal in mind does it makesense that purples and reds
are subjectively similar to one
another — that is, close to one another
in the hue circle — even though they
lie at opposite ends of the visible
spectrum.
Other perceptual tasks make this
idea even more explicit. For example,
most people can easily recognize
familiar linguistic accents across
a wide range of differences between
speakers (age, gender, and so on).
In other words, we have good
‘accent constancy’. At the same time,
it probably doesn’t make sense to
pose accent constancy as the
estimation of physical parameters of
the speaker’s vocal tract. Instead, it is
more likely that the brain identifies
auditory quantities that are
diagnostic of accent but relatively
stable across age, gender and
other vocal attributes. After all,
the hidden Markov models used by
computer speech recognition
systems identify predictive features
in the input stream, rather than
model the physics of speech
production. Thus, more generally, if
we want to understand how the
brain perceives, we should change
the way we pose the aims of
perception.References
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